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The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Bringing ‘Asian Values’ 
to Global Economic Governance? 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the recent establishment of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) through the prism of the 'Asian values' debate. It maps 
the key attributes of these 'Asian values' first, to the established institutional 
governance structures of the AIIB, and second, to its proposed decision-making 
procedures; specifically, in relation to the criteria and process for evaluating, 
assessing, and monitoring the economic, social and environmental 
sustainability of infrastructure projects that this new Multilateral Development 
Bank (MDB) will be supporting. The object of this exercise is to postulate 
whether an 'Asian values' approach to international development finance can 
be proposed as a viable alternative to currently Western-dominated institutions 
of global economic governance and ultimately, the Anglo-American form of 
capitalism that still underpins the global economy. The twin roles of China 
within the AIIB, first as the financial catalyst for AIIB investment in regional 
infrastructure projects, and second, as a potential regional hegemon through its 
dominance of the AIIB governance structure, will be canvassed. The essay 
concludes by proposing an ‘Asian values’ approach to global economic 
governance as the foundation of a new research agenda which can be used to 
assess the future operations of this Bank and other new MDBs. 
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Introduction 
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is now formally inaugurated 
and ‘open for business’, with a remit to support the financing of infrastructure 
development in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Its status as the first 
multilateral development bank (MDB) for Asia established outside the Bretton 
Woods agreement that spawned the World Bank Group and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) is thus assured in history. The Asian, specifically 
Chinese, provenance of this new international actor in global economic 
relations raises many interesting issues for 21st Century observers. This essay 
will address these issues through the prism of the ‘Asian values’ debate.  
 
Following an initial discussion of the current standing of the ‘Asian values’ 
debate, the present study will map key attributes of a putative ‘Asian values’ 
approach to the aims, objectives, institutional governance structures and 
decision-making processes established by the newly-minted AIIB. The twin 
roles of China within the AIIB, first as the financial catalyst for AIIB investment 
in regional infrastructure projects, and second, as a potential regional hegemon 
through its dominance of the AIIB governance structure, will also be examined 
within this context.  
 
This essay will then propose a research framework based on the ‘Asian values’ 
policy agenda for scrutinizing the upcoming work programme of the AIIB. In 
doing so, it is hoped that insights can be gained into whether an ‘Asian values’ 
approach to AIIB governance can achieve the elusive balance between the goals 
of sustainable economic growth, social resilience and environmental protection 
that are deemed fundamental to the future of humankind as a whole. The 
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ultimate purpose of this research enterprise is to postulate whether the 
application of an ‘Asian values’ approach through the AIIB is a viable alternative 
to Western-dominated institutions for global economic governance, such as the 
World Bank Group and the IMF, as well as the specifically Anglo-American, 
form of capitalism that currently underpins the global economy.  
 
The ‘Asian Values’ Approach in Global Governance Discourse  
The ‘Asian values’ approach, as well as the debate that this approach 
engendered, rose to prominence throughout the 1980s and early 1990s but then 
seemed to have lost its way during the (east) Asian financial crisis of the late 
1990s.1 The original coining of the phrase: ‘Asian values’ is attributed variously 
to the founder and long-standing former premier of modern Singapore – the 
late Lee Kuan Yew, and the equally prominent former Malaysian prime 
minister, Mahathir Mohamad. 2  However, it was the espousal of the ‘Asian 
values’ approach by the eminent Singaporean former diplomat and now 
academic dean, Kishore Mahbubani, 3  to explain a distinctive Asian way of 
                                                        
1 For an overview of the impact of this regional financial crisis on the ‘Asian values’ debate, see 
Mark R Thompson, 'Whatever happened to "Asian Values"?', Journal of Democracy, Vol.12 
(2001) 154-165. 
2 See: C. Y. (Chang Yau) Hoon, ‘Revisiting the Asian Values Argument used by Asian Political 
Leaders and its Validity’, Indonesian Quarterly, Vol.32, No.2 (2004) 154-174, at 154. 
3 Currently, Dean and Professor in the Practice of Public Policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of 
Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, having previously served for 33 years in 
Singapore's diplomatic service. 
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government and the governance of business, 4  that arguably captured the 
zeitgeist of the Far East Asian ‘Tiger’ economies’ ‘miracle’ in the late 20th 
Century, as well as the astonishing growth of the Chinese ‘Dragon’ economy, 
going into the second decade of the 21st Century. On the other hand, as 
Thompson notes, the 1997 East Asian economic crisis discredited the espousal 
of authoritarian 'Asian values' in Pacific Asia (East and Southeast Asia) as an 
overt explanation of the region's economic 'miracle’.5 Thus, ever since the initial 
articulations of an ‘Asian values’ approach to government and the institutional 
governance of business, a debate has ensued among policy-makers and 
commentators alike over the merits (or otherwise) of this approach. This essay 
will examine this much vaunted but also heavily criticised ‘Asian values’ 
approach in so far as it is applicable to the newly-minted Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB).  
 
A clear exposition of the ‘Asian values’ thesis would arguably provide a useful 
set of paradigm virtues against which to measure the model of economic 
governance as well as social and environmental standards adopted by AIIB.  
However, such an exercise may prove elusive. Acharya, for example, has 
commented on Asia’s huge size and diversity, noting that there is not even a 
consensus over where its boundaries lie, and thus, no single conception, voice 
                                                        
4 A seminal event in this context is an interview with Mahbubani conducted by The Economist 
magazine (UK), entitled: ’Asian Values: Scourge of the West’, reported on 22 April, 1995. 
Accessible at:  
5 Mark R. Thompson  , ‘Pacific Asia after 'Asian Values': Authoritarianism, Democracy, and 
'Good Governance'’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 6 (2004) 1079-1095  , at 1079. 
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or identity of Asia.6 As Dallmayr notes, when ‘considered geographically, ‘Asia’ 
is a vast continent comprising a multitude of different cultural strands.’ 7 
However, the ‘Asian values’ approach is ‘sometimes invoked in a starkly 
provocative manner, with the result that “Asian values” and human rights are 
pitted against each other as antithetical or incommensurable spheres.’8 In fact, 
as Emmerson has noted, ‘(t)he “Asian values” debate is not a formally organized 
oral disputation between two sides advancing contrary answers to the same 
question.’9  
 
Mahbubani applied this arguably distinctive Asian take on the conduct of 
government and business through a series of hard-hitting speeches, op-ed 
columns, articles and other media outputs.10 He subsequently fleshed-out this 
initial foray with a detailed account of the ‘Asian values’ approach towards 
governance, international governance and latterly, international finance 
governance, in more recent contributions as well as books such as The New 
Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (2008)11 
                                                        
6 Amitav Acharya, ‘Asia is not one’, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.69, No.4 (2010) 1001–1013. 
7 Fred Dallmayr, “Asian values’ and global human rights,  Philosophy East and West , Vol. 52, 
No.2 (April, 2002 ) 173-189, at 178. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Donald K. Emmerson, ‘Singapore and the "Asian Values" Debate’, Journal of Democracy, 
Vol.6, No.4 (October, 1995) 95-105, at ??? 
10  Many of these outputs can now be accessed from Mahbubani’s personal website at: 
http://www.mahbubani.net/index.html 
11 Published by Public Affairs, Perseus Books Group, New York (2008). 
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and The Great Convergence (2013)12. Mahbubani used arguments based on 
‘Asian values’ as a riposte to what he saw as Western triumphalism in the post-
1990 era, in the wake of the end of the Cold War, rather than as an independent 
espousal of these so-called ‘Asian values’ themselves. The promotion of an 
‘Asian values’ approach was formulated as an antithesis to perceived hegemonic 
Western notions of political and economic transcendence, especially in the 
aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
 
It is important to re-iterate that this Asian-oriented riposte against perceptions 
of Western transcendence has both political and economic dimensions. 
Mahbubani’s politically-based criticism of the post-1990 Western viewpoint, 
especially when it rails against the notion of individual freedoms as an 
underpinning philosophical ideal of Western, and therefore all democratically-
based political systems, has been successfully rebutted by commentators, 
including those from within Asia itself. Responding to Lee Kuan Yew’s meme 
for ‘Asian values’ in an interview with Fareed Zakaria for the Foreign Affairs 
journal, 13  for example, Kim Dae Jung observed that as an inevitable 
consequence of industrialization, family-centered East Asian societies are also 
rapidly moving toward self-centered individualism.14 Moreover, what Lee and 
his supporters see as social and individual moral breakdown is attributable not 
                                                        
12 Full title: The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World, Public Affairs 
(2013) 
13 Fareed Zakaria, ‘Culture is Destiny - A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew’, Foreign Affairs 
Vol.73, No.2 (March/April 1994) 109-126. 
14 Kim Dae Jung, ‘Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values’, in Response 
section, Foreign Affairs, Vol.73, No.6 (November/December, 1994)  
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to inherent shortcomings of Western cultures per se but to those of industrial 
societies in general; with Kim noting that a similar phenomenon is now 
spreading through Asia's newly industrializing societies. 15  More generally, 
reliance on ‘Asian values’ has not necessarily translated to new or different 
paradigms for global governance. As Acharya has observed, ‘the leading Asian 
powers—China, India and Japan—while seeking global leadership, seem to be 
more concerned with developing and legitimizing their national power 
aspirations (using the traditional notions and means of international relations) 
than with contributing to global governance.’16  
 
Mahbubani and his fellow ‘Asian values’ promoters have achieved more success 
on the economic front. To begin with, he argues that Asian economies have 
derived their success from the adoption of certain attributes of Western 
capitalism, notably, a commitment to open markets and the rule of law. 
However, he then outlined three challenges facing the Western, and specifically 
Anglo-American, varieties of capitalism. First, the political subservience of 
successive Western and especially Anglo-American governments to capitalism 
as an ideological good rather than a pragmatic instrument through which to 
improve human welfare. Second, the continuing need for good governance, 
including regulatory and supervisory institutions to ensure capitalism works 
well. Third, the need to ensure equality of work opportunities, while providing 
                                                        
15 Ibid. 
16 Amitav Acharya, ‘Can Asia lead? Power ambitions and global governance in the twenty-first 
century’, International Affairs, Vol.87, No.4 (2011) 851–869, at 851. 
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a measure of social protection from the white-heat of competition in global 
markets for goods and services.  
 
Acknowledging that for all its flaws, capitalism remains the best way to improve 
human welfare, Mahbubani has nevertheless argued that Asian countries have 
begun to address all the above existential challenges to capitalism itself better 
than their Western counterparts. For example, when Asian governments 
promoted investment and jobs creation to stave of unemployment, Western 
capitalists derided these policy interventions as market interference but when 
unemployment rose in the Western economies, this was allegedly due to unfair 
competition of cheap goods and labour from East Asia.17 
 
There is thus a continuing debate over the existence, evidence for, and intrinsic 
value of the ‘Asian’ approach within the specific context of governance of the 
global political economy. Underpinning the Mahbubani thesis is a new, Asian-
oriented, assertiveness in world affairs and international relations. This Asian 
resurgence is in line with growing regional economic prosperity and political 
stability. Moreover, it is no longer limited solely to the well-known Far East 
Asian ‘Tiger’ and Chinese ‘Dragon’ economies but now much more 
geographically wide-spread, especially throughout mainland and archipelagic 
East Asia, as well as South Asia. This new Asian assertiveness can also be 
abrasive, especially when it comes to alleged instances of double-standards. For 
example, the very strictly imposed IMF conditional bailouts of East Asian 
                                                        
17 Kishore Mahbubani, ‘Western capitalism has much to learn from Asia’, Financial Times 
newspaper (UK) 7 February, 2012.  
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economies in the late 1990s, which allowed several major domestic banks to go 
the wall, is contrasted with the relative ease with which a similar IMF bailout 
was offered to Greece during the financial crisis of 2008-2009.18 This was in 
addition to generous Western national government protection of large Anglo-
American and European-based banks at the same time. As Rachman notes, 
‘(t)he perception of bias towards the West is even more problematic  when it 
comes to the world’s two leading international economic institutions - the IMF 
and the World Bank.’19 
 
Distilling the essence of all these contributions to the ‘Asian values’ debate, it is 
possible to enumerate these ‘Asian values’ themselves, alongside further 
iterations of their implications only in general terms, as follows: First, at its 
heart, the ‘Asian values’ approach is a claim to the positive aspects of 
‘groupthink’20, rather than (Western) individualistic, freedom-based method of 
setting and achieving collective goals for business and/or government. Buruma, 
for example, re-iterates Lee Kuan Yew’s argument was that Asians were used to 
putting the collective good above individual interests. They are communitarian 
                                                        
18 Gideon Rachman, Easternisation: War and Peace in the Asian Century, London: Bodley 
Head (2016) at 230. 
19 Ibid., at 229. 
20 The use of ‘groupthink’ in this context is a reference to its original meaning as used by William 
H. Whyte, Jr., who coined the term in 1952 in Fortune magazine: ‘Groupthink being a coinage 
- and, admittedly, a loaded one - a working definition is in order. We are not talking about mere 
instinctive conformity - it is, after all, a perennial failing of mankind. What we are talking about 
is a rationalized conformity - an open, articulate philosophy which holds that group values are 
not only expedient but right and good as well.’ 
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rather than individualistic in their orientation, and naturally obedient to higher 
authority. These traits were rooted in Asian history: they were deep ‘Asian 
values’.21  
 
Lee himself later re-cast these values as specifically Confucian (Chinese) ideals 
of individual, family and State relationships, 22  thus ‘muddying the waters’ 
somewhat as to the true provenance of so-called ‘Asian values’. As Dallmayr 
observes, ‘the term "Asian values" has been linked chiefly with Confucian 
teachings, with Buddhist and Taoist legacies being treated more like variations 
on, or internal reactions to, the former; still, to avoid oversimplification, some 
awareness of diversity should be maintained.’23 According to Donnelly, this 
Asian/Chinese system of values and social relations is ‘incompatible with the 
vision of equal and autonomous individuals that underlies international human 
rights norms’.24 
 
                                                        
21  Ian Buruma, Asian Values RIP, Project Syndicate, posted:  4 April, 2015. Accessible at: 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/asian-values-lee-kuan-yew-by-ian-buruma-
2015-04 
22 See: Lee Kuan Yew & Terry McCarthy, "In Defense of 'Asian Values"', Time magazine, Vol.151, 
No.10 (16 March, 1998) & Michael Barr, "Lee Kuan Yew and the 'Asian Values' Debate", Asian 
Studies Review Vol.24, no.3 (September, 2000) 313.  
23 Dallmayr (2002) op. cit., at 178. 
24 Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense of 'Western' Universalism’, in 
Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 80. 
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Second, as the ‘Asian values’ approach is also structured around duties not 
rights, 25  it is characterised by a prioritised individual commitment to pre-
determined group or community goals. At the level of government, this is 
manifested by patient, consensus-based and deliberative decision-making 
processes on important or significant issues of the day. These collective 
decisions aim to achieve community goals, rather than individual preferences 
or targets.  On the other hand, once such group-based collective decisions are 
made, swift progress to implement such decisions can be made, with a ‘can-do’ 
attitude prevailing. This is at least in part due to the absence of any individual 
loose cannons whose views were presumably already dealt with during the 
consensual decision-making process undertaken prior to the collective 
decision. This avowed Asian value of subsuming individual preferences to the 
collective group interest may prove to be a welcome difference to Western-
based international institutions dominated by strong individual personalities, 
whose external high profiles often belie internal institutional discord and 
insufficiently detailed attention to the work at hand.  
 
Finally, any disputes that remain or arise in an Asian regional context are 
usually resolved, or at least managed, in a consultative and consensus-based 
manner, with an emphasis on ensuring no individual ‘loss of face’. 
Irreconcilable differences are not allowed to fester in the foreground, but 
instead politely set aside or firmly placed in the background, at least until an 
                                                        
25 Yash Ghai, ‘Rights, Duties and Responsibilities’, in Josiane Cauquelin, Paul Lim and Birgit 
Mayer-Konig, eds., Asian blues: Encounter with Diversity (Surrey: Curwn, 1998) 29.  
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opportune future moment arises for their resolution, possibly in conjunction 
with the settlement of several other issues between the parties, so that one 
party’s compromise over a single issue is matched by the opposing party’s 
reconciliation on another pressing topic. Thus, it is no surprise that many Asian 
countries still prefer to settle their international disputes through the more 
traditional and longer-standing mode of diplomatic negotiations.  
 
There is also an emphasis on the promotion of long-term, ‘win-win’ solutions 
across a broad spectrum of bilateral interests that exist between the two parties, 
rather than focussing on short-term, legal ‘victories’ on specific issues of 
disagreement between them. In this sense, the ‘Asian values’ approach to 
dispute settlement eschews winner-take-all confrontations, particularly the 
publicized manifestations thereof, in the form of international litigation that 
clearly distinguishes between winning and losing parties. Instead, the ‘Asian 
values’ approach is in favour of negotiated, albeit highly compromised, 
solutions. Understanding this emphasis on long-term solutions rather than 
short-term gain would, for example, explain the muted reactions of fellow 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) members to the recent 
international arbitral tribunal award that is ostensibly in favour of the 
Philippines in its ongoing dispute with China over certain maritime features in 
the South China Sea.26 
                                                        
26 This tribunal was established under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Convention (UNCLOS) and convened under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA). See: South China Sea Arbitration Award, Philippines v China, 12 July, 2016, PCA Case 
No.2013-19. Available at: 
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While the more idealized aspects of this summarized set of elements of the 
‘Asian values’ approach will be questioned by many observers and criticized by 
others, there can be little doubt that Mahbubani and his fellow travellers have 
tapped into a powerful alternative narrative for explaining the tremendous 
socio-economic successes of Far Eastern polities in Asia, initially in relation to 
the ‘Tiger’ economies of Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, and latterly, with 
the rapid emergence of the Chinese ‘Dragon’ economy. In particular, it is 
important to note that the ‘Asian values’ approach emphasizes the need for 
continuing social cohesion of national communities in Asia, even in the face of 
increasing material wealth. This is a significant differential indicator from 
Western-style materialism, which due to its perceived individualism is seen as 
leading inexorably to social inequality and thence to social division. This is 
despite increasing evidence of social breakdown due to materialistic  
 
However, this emphasis on social cohesion above all else often results in 
tolerance for authoritarian, rather than laissez-faire, forms of democratic 
government. Democracy itself is not disputed as a global public good, simply 
the form of capitalist-based democracy that favours rampant individualism at 
the expense of others. The much-touted evidence for this continuing sense of 
community within Asian societies usually relies on the relatively low level 
incidence of domestic crime, and the much less litigious nature of business and 
personal relationship breakdowns. To be sure, several of these measures are 
now exhibiting ambivalent trends but the over-riding feeling remains one in 
                                                        
https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf 
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which these ‘Asian values’ do amount to something tangibly different in the 
socio-economic make-up of many modern Asian societies, especially in the 
eastern and southern Asian regions.  
 
The net effect of this different approach to the relationship between 
governmental forms and socio-economic progress is that Asian views on 
governance in general, and economic governance in particular, have begun to 
diverge from mainstream Anglo-American thinking. Unlike the Anglo-
American reticence on government regulatory controls of the markets, Asian 
polities have traditionally not looked at government itself as the problem.27 
Indeed, most Asian policy-makers habitually work on the pragmatic 
assumption that in the real world, it is the balance between the ‘invisible hand’ 
of free markets and the ‘visible hand’ of good governance that is all-important 
in a nation’s pathway to social cohesion and economic prosperity.28 According 
to Chesterman and Mahbubani, good governance is not only about ‘inputs’ such 
as the legitimacy and representative aspects of government but more about its 
so-called ‘outputs’: Is government realizing its socio-economic goals effectively, 
efficiently and equitably?29 This is despite the obvious rejoinder as to whether 
those who decide these goals and how they are to be achieved in an Asian 
                                                        
27 Kishore Mahbubani, ‘Commentary: New Asian Perspectives on Governance’, in Governance: 
An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, Vol.23, No.2 (April, 
2010) 205-208, at 205. 
28 Ibid., at 207. 
29 Simon Chesterman and Kishore Mahbubani, ‘Can Asians Resolve Global Problems?’ Project 
Syndicate (2010) Accessible at http://www.project-syndicate.org 
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context are in themselves democratic and transparent in their decision-making 
processes.  
 
The apparently realist perspective engendered by the ‘Asian values’ approach 
would seem to have resulted in a non-generic attitude to the construction of 
institutional governance forms, emphasizing the need to find out what works in 
any given situation, rather than establishing institutional structures based on 
an ultimately misplaced ideological commitment to purity of substance and 
form. Indeed, as Mahbubani and Summers suggest, the Asian experience shows 
that ‘modernization does not simply equal westernization - that it is possible to 
pursue, say, economic and social development while still retaining distinctive 
cultural characteristics.’ 30  However, many fear this trend may lead to 
revisionist foreign policies that seek to end not just regional hegemonic 
dominance by the United States, but eventually also the global institutions 
created by the United States and Europe over the last 70 years.31  
 
On the other hand, as Acharya has noted, ‘(A) central challenge facing global 
order today is the seeming contradiction between the desire of Asia’s leading 
states to be recognized and treated as global powers on the one hand, and their 
limited and hesitant contribution to global governance on the other.’32 Mathews 
                                                        
30  Kishore Mahbubani and Lawrence H., ‘The Fusion of Civilizations: The Case for Global 
Optimism’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.95 No.3 (May/June, 2016) 126-135, at 129. 
31 John Mearsheimer, ‘The gathering storm: China’s challenge to US power in Asia’, Chinese 
Journal of International Politics, Vol.3,No.4 (2010) 381–96.  
32 Acharya, International Affairs (2011) op. cit., at 852. 
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agrees, pointing out that Asian countries have so far been beneficiaries, rather 
than creators of international regimes and institutions conceived and built by 
the West, inter alia, to manage global finance and underwrite economic 
development.33  This view is echoed by Feigenbaum, specifically in relation to 
China, when he notes that ‘China is a disruptive power but not a revolutionary 
one. Its size, wealth, and assertive foreign policy lead it to demand significant 
changes to existing institutions, but it does not seek to overturn the current 
international order wholesale.’34 While no overtly global alternatives have so 
far been proposed by Asian economies in the international finance sector, the 
emergence of regional finance institutions with far-reaching aspirations, such 
as the Chinese-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), has led 
to speculation on the sustainability of existing global finance institutions such 
as the World Bank and the IMF. 
 
Chinese dominance of this new international finance institution has also 
spawned criticism of its own perceived hegemonic tendencies. In countering 
both the conceptual assumptions of the prevailing world economic order as 
inherently liberal and democratic, as well as promoting the Chinese role within 
this new economic governance model, Zhang offers two valuable insights from 
existing literature: ‘One is that China is rising within an order not of its own 
                                                        
33  Jessica T. Mathews, ‘Can China Replace the West?’ a review article of Rachman’s 
‘Easternization’ (sic) (2016) op. cit., in The New York Review of Books (NYRB), Vol.LXIV, No.8, 
May 11-24, 2017, 14-16, at 16.  
34  Evan A. Feigenbaum, ‘China and the World: Dealing With a Reluctant Power’, Foreign 
Affairs (January/February, 2017) 33-40, at 33. 
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making. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was not “present at the creation” 
of the key global economic institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. 
Until very recently, it has always been a rule/norm taker rather than a 
rule/norm maker in the expanding institutional networks for global 
governance. … The second point is (the) historically unusual pattern of 
concentration of power is not seen only in the unprecedented preponderance of 
American power in both material and ideational terms. It is also reflected in the 
arrival of China, a non-western power with a self-proclaimed developing 
country identity and an authoritarian regime, as the second among equals in 
the Great Power club, arguably with its own purpose and project.’35  
 
On the other hand, Oliver and Williams have noted that the United States has 
countered this perception of emerging Asian initiatives through efforts such as 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and proposed Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), both of which are intended to boost the existing 
rules-based system. 36  President Trump’s pre-emptive withdrawal from the 
TPP, when coupled with his stated desire to do the same with the still-to-be 
negotiated TTIP, arguably acts to strengthen China’s role within this Great 
Power club, especially within the economic sphere.  
 
                                                        
35  Yongjin Zhang, ‘China and liberal hierarchies in global international society: power and 
negotiation for normative change’, International Affairs, Vol.92, No.4 (2016) 795–816, at 797. 
36 Tim Oliver and Michael John Williams, ‘Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of 
the US–EU and US–UK relationships’, International Affairs Vol.92, No.3 (2016) 547–567, at 
551, citing Ramesh Thakur, ‘A lesson in the geopolitics of infrastructure finance’, Japan Times, 
21 June 2015. 
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A further and intriguing Great Powers-related perspective to bring to bear in 
the overall global geo-political situation is the notion that China itself may be 
looking over its shoulder at the emerging role of India as a competing future 
global economic power on the Chinese south-western flank. As Mahbubani and 
Summers have observed, ‘(a)lthough China’s rise has been one of the 
universally acknowledged wonders of the age, India’s recent rise has been 
impressive as well, as India, too, has embraced modernization, globalization, 
and Enlightenment rationalism. Along the way, India has maintained the 
world’s largest democracy, successfully accommodated an amazingly diverse 
cultural and demographic mosaic, …’37 
 
In this regard, India has already voiced concerns over its place within the 
geographical framework of the Chinese Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road 
initiative, fearing that these major infrastructure links ‘will create a Chinese 
sphere of influence that will encircle India.’38 As Cai has recently pointed out,  
there is a significant lack of political trust between China and a number of 
important regional countries along the ‘Belt and Road’ routes. India, for 
example, has stated that it would not commit to buy-into this unilateral Chinese 
initiative without significant consultation.39  Rachman concludes that ‘these 
                                                        
37 Mahbubani & Summers (2016) op. cit., at 133. 
38 Gideon Rachman, ‘China, India and the clash of two great civilizations’, Financial Times, UK 
newspaper, 6 June, 2017, at 13. 
39 Peter Cai, Analysis: Understanding the Chinese Belt & Road Inititative, Lowy Institute  for 
International Policy, Sydney, Australia (March, 2017) 22pp, at 15. Accessible at: 
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/documents/Understanding%20China’s%20
Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative_WEB_1.pdf 
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arguments reflect the fact that China and India represent more than just rival 
powers but rival political systems, ideologies, even civilizations’40, such that ‘it 
is the contest between China and India that may ultimately shape the 21st 
Century.’41 
  
‘Asian Values’ and Global Economic Governance 
Given the divergence between Asian and Western attitudes to governance in 
general, and financial system governance in particular, as exemplified by the 
‘Asian values’ approach, it is worth asking what contribution (if any) this 
approach can bring to the new economic governance forms that are beginning 
to take shape in this region such as the AIIB and the TPP. This question is 
pertinent bearing in mind that the former institution (AIIB) is currently 
proceeding without US participation, albeit with less antagonism than 
previously expressed, 42  whereas the latter agreement (TPP) was initially 
adopted between the US and several of its Asian allies without Chinese input, 
but may now be turning towards accepting a role for China for its salvation, 
following the US withdrawal. 
 
As David Dollar of the Brookings Institution has observed, with China pursuing 
the AIIB and other initiatives that currently do not include the USA, while the 
TPP did not involve China, this creates a risk of competing blocs and 
                                                        
40 Rachman, Financial Times (2017) op. cit., at 13. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Shawn Donnan, ‘White House declares truce with China over AIIB’, Financial Times, 27 Sept. 
2015. Accessible at: https://www.ft.com/content/23c51438-64ca-11e5-a28b-50226830d644 
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institutions. Here, Dollar’s perceptive insight on the potentially mutual benefit 
of both these broad regional initiatives paves the way for reconciliation between 
them. Using the metaphors of ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ for international 
economic integration, wherein AIIB financial support for significant 
infrastructure is the necessary ‘hardware’ of economic integration, while the 
TPP (or its successor) is the ‘software’, Dollar argues that by bringing this 
‘hardware’ and ‘software’ together, the outcome could be a more integrated Asia 
Pacific economy.43 Optimistically, he concludes that the AIIB is likely to become 
a part of the global financial architecture in such a way as to make the other 
MDBs more effective.  
 
Moreover, he predicted that China and other Asian countries that are presently 
not involved in TPP (or its successor) are likely to join this arrangement if it is 
successful so that the most likely outcome is that the world ends up with a more 
robust and inclusive set of global economic institutions.44 Dollar’s prediction of 
eventual Chinese engagement with the TPP has therefore proved prescient, 
albeit for a very different reason than he projected. Following the US 
withdrawal, it is notable that TPP parties are pivoting towards China to salvage 
this Agreement. Mathews observes that ‘China sent high-level officials to a 
meeting of the eleven remaining TPP members to discuss  forming a new 
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regional trade regime in which it (China), and not the US, would be a 
member.’45 
 
As Madhur notes, the perceived need for Asia to play a major role in setting the 
agenda for global economic governance and designing the institutional 
architecture for achieving this agenda reflects the fact that the centre of gravity 
of the global economy has shifted towards Asia, with this trend being likely to 
continue in the decades to come. Asia's growing economic weight enhances its 
potential to play a much stronger role in shaping 21st century global economic 
governance. 46  However, he cautions that realization of that potential will 
depend upon how successfully Asia addresses five key challenges: rebalancing 
sources of economic growth; strengthening national governance; 
institutionalizing regional integration; providing political leadership; and 
adopting the global lingua franca — English. While the ‘Asian values’ debate 
arguably presaged the growing ambition of Asian policy-makers on global 
economic governance matters, Madhur questions whether their appetite for 
addressing the necessary policy challenges is keeping pace with that ambition. 
He concludes that the continuing gap between ambition and action will need to 
be closed before Asia can play a larger role in global economic governance.47 
This echoes a cautionary note at the end of Ikenberry’s review of The New Asian 
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Hemisphere, 48  where he acknowledges that although Mahbubani makes a 
compelling case for a Western strategy of power sharing with Asia, he is less 
convincing in arguing that Asia will be more competent and enlightened in its 
stewardship of the world.  
 
So, what can the ‘Asian values’ approach bring to the global governance table? 
Here, Chesterman and Mahbubani have outlined both the positive and negative 
elements of a putative Asian approach to the challenges of global governance, 
as follows: ‘The positive aspects include respect for diversity and an emphasis 
on consensus-building over conflict, practical solutions over lofty principles 
and gradualism over abrupt change. On the other hand, the desire to avoid 
confrontation can prevent meaningful agreements from being reached in a 
reasonable timeframe, and the appearance of consensus may merely mask the 
true politics at work.’49 Thus, implementing the positive aspects of an ‘Asian 
values’ approach may result in more inclusive decision-making in global 
governance institutions, but also invites the possibility of stalemate, or more 
rhetoric than substance.50  
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Despite these concerns, Mahbubani has continued to be stark in his assessment 
of the potential of the AIIB when juxtaposed against the currently Western-
dominated public international development finance institutions. He baldly 
observes that the World Bank, IMF and their related bodies have become over-
bureaucratic and sclerotic, while expressing the hope that China would be able 
to develop a lean and mean bureaucratic machine to run the AIIB.51 Indeed, 
Mahbubani is looking forward to the Chinese doing a better job of managing 
this new institution, and thus introducing new rules in the international finance 
game that the majority of the countries around the world may find more 
congenial.52  
 
By contrast, Elek has struck a more conciliatory and arguably also more realistic 
note by observing that the AIIB is meant to supplement, not supersede let alone 
replace, the World Bank and its regional sister institutions such as the Asian 
Development Bank, African Development Bank, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and Inter-American Development 
Bank. He also notes presciently that drawing from the expertise of experienced 
MDBs would be the most efficient way to build the capacity of the new bank to 
assess and implement a rapidly growing number of projects successfully. 
Widespread participation by governments who are also significant 
shareholders in the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank would 
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52 Ibid. 
24 
 
maximize the potential for synergy.53  
 
This need for re-conciliation between Asian and Western perspectives is 
imperative given the initial concerns expressed by the (US) White House 
National Security Council over whether the AIIB will meet the high standards 
of the World Bank, particularly related to governance, and environmental and 
social safeguards.54 Luft is critical of what he sees as a misguided approach of 
the United States to the AIIB in this regard, which he suggests has been futile.55  
Moreover, he notes that it risks allowing China to shape Eurasia’s economic and 
political future without U.S. input, denies American investors opportunities to 
profit from major infrastructure projects; and could stifle a source of much-
needed growth for Asia’s developing economies and Europe’s stagnating ones.56  
 
Possibly in response to U.S. skepticism over the AIIB’s role as a new MDB in 
the world of international development finance, the AIIB has recently stated 
that: ‘AIIB will work in close cooperation with other international financial 
institutions and international organizations concerned with economic 
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development of the region or the Bank's operational areas. Its activities will 
complement and supplement the programs of both the existing and newly 
established MDBs, such as the New Development Bank (NDB) formed by the 
BRICS States. 57  The existing MDBs have been generous in sharing their 
expertise and lessons of their experiences with AIIB. The Secretariat is actively 
exploring potential for co-financing with other MDBs once AIIB becomes 
operational.’58  
 
Notwithstanding these AIIB overtures to other MDBs, the fact remains that to 
sustain their continuing socio-economic growth, Asian infrastructure 
development finance is imperative. For example, the Asian Development Bank 
Institute (ADBI), estimates that developing Asian economies will need to invest 
US$8 trillion from 2010 to 2020, just to keep pace with expected infrastructure 
needs, with more than 32% of this projected figure needed just to maintain or 
replace current infrastructure.59 Luft observes that ‘(o)ver the course of the next 
                                                        
57 BRICS is the acronym for an association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, 
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four years, Asian countries will need around US$800 billion annually to build 
the transport, energy, and communications networks that they require to 
achieve their development goals.’60  
 
At the same time, the 2008 global financial crisis has reduced the overall capital 
lending sums of the World Bank Group,61 including the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). Thus, the investment provided by these MDBs meets less than ten 
percent of this overall need so that even if the AIIB and China’s other funding 
outfits live up to their promise, the money will still fall short. 62  Moreover, 
private international finance for infrastructure has also fallen to one-third of its 
pre-crisis total.63 Hence, the enthusiastic welcome for the AIIB among Asian 
developing economies. Mahbubani, for example, is in no doubt that the AIIB 
and to a lesser extent, the New Development Bank (NDB),64 can emerge as 
competing international finance development institutions to the traditionally 
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Western-dominated World Bank Group and IMF.65 
 
In its 2015 Global Economic Situation and Prospects report, the UN noted with 
approval such regional financing initiatives as the NDB and the AIIB for 
creating the ‘potential for scaling up financing’66 as well as ‘provide additional 
resources for investment in sustainable development.’67 The new AIIB has an 
authorized capital base of US$100 billion, with $10 billion as initial paid-in 
capital. China is expected to provide half of the capital. Moreover, as the UN 
report observed, given that China has the highest credit rating among the 
BRICS countries, its outsized capital contribution to the AIIB may result in an 
even better than expected credit rating for the AIIB, and thus enable it to 
borrow on better terms than the NDB. This could potentially enable AIIB to 
disburse higher volumes and values of loans compared to the NDB, particularly 
for infrastructure investment.68  
 
On the other hand, since China has contributed to the capitalization of the AIIB 
from its own reserves, the well-known phrase: ‘he who pays the piper, calls the 
tune’ comes to mind. The difficult task therefore will be to safeguard the AIIB 
from simply becoming a vehicle for furthering Chinese national interests. In 
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response to concerns over the perceived dominance of China within the AIIB, 
Dollar points out: ‘Now that a diverse group of nearly 60 countries have signed 
up, it would be difficult for China to use the bank to finance projects in favoured 
countries over the exclusion of other members.’69 This is pertinent, given both 
the geographically widespread and geo-politically significant membership of 
the AIIB, including major European powers such as Germany, France, and the 
UK, as well as India and Australia, among its Founding Members.70 
 
Nevertheless, the over-arching Chinese strategic vision for the AIIB clearly 
envisages its prominent role in the Chinese One Belt, One Road (OBOR), also 
known as the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road and Economic Belt initiative.71 
Through this initiative, China hopes to ‘build a community of shared interests, 
destiny and responsibility featuring mutual political trust, economic 
integration and cultural inclusiveness.’ 72  Specifically, the Economic Belt 
initiative will mainly be composed of transport infrastructure projects aimed at 
creating an ‘economic belt’ linking China with Mongolia, central Asia, Russia, 
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Iran, Turkey, the Balkans, central and eastern Europe, and finally, Germany 
and the Netherlands. Whereas the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ will link south-east 
China with south-east Asia, Bangladesh, India, the Persian Gulf and the 
Mediterranean, ultimately also ending up in Germany and the Netherlands.73  
The AIIB will be tasked with at least partially financing much-needed 
infrastructure all along and across the land (Silk Belt) and sea (Silk Road) 
routes of this far-reaching Chinese foreign policy initiative. Indeed, the AIIB, 
along with the NDB and the Silk Road Fund - a specific Belt and Road Initiative-
related Chinese government fund - will lend nearly US$200 billion to 
infrastructure projects over the coming decade.74 
 
Herein lies the greatest challenge to the collectivist notion underpinning the 
‘Asian values’ argument – how to ensure that China does not dominate the AIIB 
decision-making structures in much the same way as the USA and Western 
European countries previously did, and still do, with the World Bank and its 
sister multilateral development banks (MDBs) around the world. As Rachman 
observes, the warm welcome to the Chinese-established and dominated AIIB is 
widely perceived as both a reflection of China’s growing financial muscle, as 
well as a reaction to long-held international perceptions of innate pro-Western 
bias at the Bretton Woods institutions.75 With regard to the asymmetries within 
the decision-making structures of the Western international finance 
                                                        
73 Peter Ferdinand, ‘Westward ho—the China dream and ‘one belt, one road’: Chinese foreign 
policy under Xi Jinping’, International Affairs Vol.92, No. 4 (July, 2016) 941-957, at 949-950. 
74 Luft, Foreign Affairs (2016) op. cit., at 70. 
75 Rachman (2016) op. cit., at 230. 
30 
 
institutions, Mahbubani and Summers caution that ‘the legitimacy of the 
system depends on the perception that its rules are developed by and applied 
fairly and equally to all, rather than that they cater to the narrow interests of a 
few.’76  
 
‘Asian Values’ and Institutional Design of the AIIB 
At this juncture, some basic facts about the AIIB and key provisions of its 
founding Articles of Agreement can be introduced as follows: This Agreement 
was adopted on 29 June, 2015, and entered into force on 25 December, 2015. 
The treaty depository, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has confirmed that 
instruments of ratification had been deposited by 17 signatory States, with 
initial capital subscriptions totaling 50.1% of the shares allocated. 77 
Membership of the AIIB is open to members of the World Bank or the ADB, 
although the Board of Governors is responsible for decisions on new members. 
Currently, fifty-six members have signed the Articles of Agreement and there 
are 30 ratifications among these States. Remaining signatory States that have 
not yet deposited their instruments of ratification are expected to do so by the 
end of 2016, and become members thereafter.78  
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The AIIB will have a Board of Governors, a Board of Directors, a President, one 
or more Vice-Presidents, and such other officers and staff as may be considered 
necessary.79 Each member of the AIIB will appoint a Governor to represent it 
on the Board of Governors. All powers of the AIIB are vested in the Board of 
Governors.80 The Board of Governors meets annually and can delegate any of 
its powers to the Board of Directors except certain reserved powers. 81  The 
Board of Directors will be responsible for the direction of the AIIB's general 
operations and, for this purpose, will exercise all the powers delegated to them 
by the Board of Governors. 82  The Board of Directors will supervise the 
management and the operation of the Bank on a regular basis and will establish 
an oversight mechanism for that purpose in line with the principles of 
transparency, openness, independence and accountability.83 The mechanism is 
expected to address such areas as audit, evaluation, fraud and corruption, 
project complaints and staff grievances.  
 
The stated purposes of the AIIB are to: (i) foster sustainable economic 
development, create wealth and improve infrastructure connectivity in Asia by 
investing in infrastructure and other productive sectors; and (ii) promote 
regional cooperation and partnership in addressing development challenges by 
working in close collaboration with other multilateral and bilateral 
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development institutions. 84  In line with these aims, the AIIB has broad 
functions, similar to other MDBs around the world.  Under its Articles of 
Agreement, the AIIB's functions include: (i) promoting public and private 
investment in the Asia region for development, in particular for infrastructure 
and other productive sectors; (ii) utilizing the resources at its disposal for 
financing such development in the region; and (iii) encouraging private 
investment that contributes to economic development in the Asia region, in 
particular in infrastructure and other productive sectors, and supplementing 
private investment when private capital is not available on reasonable terms 
and conditions.85 The AIIB is therefore set to become the first MDB that is 
specifically established and institutionally-designed by its predominantly Asian 
members to provide financial support for infrastructure development and 
regional connectivity in Asia.  
 
In addition to the USD$100 billion of capital subscribed by members, the AIIB 
has stated that it will raise funds primarily through the issuance of bonds in 
financial markets as well as through the inter-bank market transactions and 
other financial instruments. It may also raise funds through borrowing or other 
means, in member countries or elsewhere. When doing so, the AIIB will seek to 
obtain the highest credit rating possible to facilitate borrowing in capital 
markets. 86  Recipients of AIIB financing may include member countries or 
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agencies and entities or enterprises in member territories as well as 
international or regional agencies or entities concerned with the economic 
development of the region. As the functions and purpose of the Bank focus on 
the economic development of the Asia region, the Bank could be authorized to 
provide financing to recipients located outside the region that contributes to the 
economic development of the Asia region.87  
 
Moreover, the AIIB also plans to work in concert with (rather than in 
competition against) both the ADB and the World Bank to fulfil its functions, 
which include: (i) promoting public and private investment in the Asia region 
for infrastructure development and in other productive sectors; (ii) utilizing the 
resources at its disposal for financing such development in the region; and (iii) 
supplementing private investment that contributes to economic development 
in the Asia region when private capital is not available on reasonable terms and 
conditions. Positive signs of the former relationship (between the AIIB and the 
ADB) developing can be discerned from their signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding at the ADB’s 49th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors in 
Frankfurt, Germany, setting the stage for, inter alia, jointly financing 
projects.88  The AIIB and ADB have swiftly followed this initiative with the 
recent announcement that these two Banks will jointly-finance an initial project 
for a highway in Pakistan to the tune of US$100 million each, with the United 
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Kingdom government’s Department for International Development (DfID) also 
committing a $34 million grant for the project. The ADB will act as the lead 
financier and administer both the AIIB loan and the DfID grant for this project. 
89 
 
Evidence of both the Asian emphasis on a collective approach to institutional 
decision-making, as well as the traditional attributes of Western MDBs, can be 
discerned at the Bank’s launch on 25 December 2015, when the AIIB Articles of 
Agreement (also known as its Charter) entered into force. The then AIIB 
President-designate Jin Liqun noted, ‘our shareholders have worked tirelessly 
and collegially over the past year to articulate the foundational principles that 
will underpin the Bank - transparency, openness, accountability and 
independence - and to develop a state of the art charter and robust policy and 
governance framework to guide its operations.’90  
 
Following this up in his inaugural speech at the formal establishment of the 
AIIB on 16 January, 2016,91  the now President Jin again clarified that the 
process of its establishment had been both participatory and inclusive, and 
moreover, that its Charter embodies the views, voices, and values of its 
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shareholders. He then pledged that the AIIB would do its best to promote 
broad-based economic and social development through sustainable 
infrastructure investment in the Bank’s member countries, as well as protect 
the environment and take care of the people in project areas, stating his 
commitment to run AIIB as an organization which is ‘lean, clean and green’.92 
These terms have been elaborated by the AIIB as follows: lean, with a small 
efficient management team and highly skilled staff; clean, an ethical 
organization with zero tolerance for corruption; and green, an institution built 
on respect for the environment.93  
 
These aspirational attributes of the AIIB will be juxtaposed against so-called 
‘Asian values’ approach highlighted by Chesterman and Mahbubani (above), 
namely, a cultural preference for consensual decision-making, favouring 
pragmatic solutions over ideological strictures, and gradualism over abrupt 
change, in relation to this new public international finance institution. Mapping 
the main elements of the ‘Asian values’ approach on to the three strictures laid 
down by AIIB President Jin, namely, that of 1) institutional efficiency; 2) 
transparent and corruption-free decision-making; as well as 3) social and 
environmental sustainability considerations, represents both a challenge and 
an opportunity for purveyors of this Asian-oriented approach to show how AIIB 
governance is different from the generic Western-based international 
institutional governance model. The institutionalization of these goals of 
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efficiency, transparency, and sustainability, provide the criteria upon which to 
build an evaluative framework for assessing whether an ‘Asian values’ approach 
to AIIB governance can prove to be a better model for global economic 
governance. 
 
To re-iterate: The key novelties of the AIIB are a non-resident board of 
directors, more delegation of decision-making to AIIB management, and more 
flexibility in implementing environmental and social safeguards for projects 
that AIIB decides to finance. These institutional innovations within AIIB 
governance first need to be assessed according to the criteria of efficiency, 
transparency, and sustainability, before being further evaluated as to whether 
their application is reflective of an ‘Asian values’ approach to institutional 
economic governance. In other words, is there a link between an ‘Asian values’ 
approach to economic governance and these attributes of efficiency, 
transparency, and sustainability, that the AIIB purports to reflect? Such 
connexions between intrinsic values, institutional governance structures and 
evaluative criteria by which to measure individual institutional decisions are 
difficult to make. For example, it is not clear that more delegation to AIIB 
management to ensure streamlined decision-making and thus, ‘efficiency’, is 
necessarily reflective of the more consensual approach to decision-making, an 
‘Asian value’ that the AIIB would also presumably espouse.  
 
Within this context, it may be noted that several of these AIIB institutional 
novelties are in fact reflective of the key recommendations of the 2009 Zedillo 
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Commision report on World Bank governance reform.94  This commission had 
a majority of representatives from the developing world and was led by former 
Mexican president Zedillo. This Zedillo report had already raised specific 
criticisms of US and European dominance in the World Bank or International 
Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) as it is officially known. 
Essentially, the two main criticisms that are significant in the present 
circumstances relate to 1) the US and European dominance in voting 
shares/rights within the overall governance structure of the World Bank, and 
2) the unwieldy nature of the Bank’s strategic and decision-making bodies, in 
terms of their capacity for effectiveness and efficiency in their operations.  
 
First, the Commission identified specific concerns regarding the allocation of 
voting power of in several arms of the World Bank Group. For example, in the 
World Bank itself, the share of basic votes in total voting power had eroded 
significantly since its inception, when the basic votes accounted for 11 per cent 
of total votes. Despite a decision to increase basic votes from the 2.86 per cent 
in 2009 to a fixed level of 5.5 per cent of total voting power, this level remains 
low by historical standards and perhaps more significantly, relative to those in 
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other MDBs. 95  The same concern holds true for the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) – part of the World Bank Group - where the share of basic 
votes had eroded to just 1.82 per cent when the Commission published its 
report.96 These downward trends in the basic vote proportions have primarily 
affected the voice and participation of the World Bank’s smallest and poorest 
member States in a negative way.  
 
On the other hand, both in the World Bank and IFC, the shareholdings and 
voting power of certain growing economies are not proportionate to their 
relative size in the global economy. The allocation of voting power and the 
special majority that is required for amending the World Bank’s Articles of 
Agreement also gave rise to the so-called ‘US veto’. Quite apart from its practical 
implications, the Commission noted that this feature of the establishing 
instrument for the World Bank contributed to the widespread sense that the 
institution is dominated by its largest shareholder. 97  By contrast, the AIIB 
Articles of Agreement provide that the basic votes for all its members will 
constitute 12 percent of the total number of votes at any time.98  
 
                                                        
95 For  example,  in  the  Asian  Development  Bank  the  share  of  basic  votes  is
  fixed  at  20  percent   
of  total  voting   power.  See: Zedillo Commission Report (2009) ibid., at p.xi and para.81, 
at 25, fn.39. 
96 Ibid., at p.xi and para.96, at 28. 
97 Ibid., at p.xii. 
98 See: Article 28(1)(i) of the AIIB Articles of Agreement (or Charter). 
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Second, the Zedillo report suggested that the Executive Board of the World 
Bank, with 25 chairs, is too large to serve as an effective strategy-setting and 
decision-making body.99 Accordingly, the Commission recommended adopting 
a Board of Directors that is relatively compact and therefore arguably more 
efficient and effective. The Commission proposed that the World Bank Group’s 
Board should be reduced to 20 chairs from the current 25. Moreover, Board 
consolidation would be achieved in part by reducing the number of European 
chairs by no less than four. 100 By contrast, the Board of Directors of the AIIB 
has less than half of this number, with just 12 Directors: nine elected by regional 
members and three elected by non-regional members.101  
 
A further manifestation of this leaner but arguably still effective approach to the 
overall governance and institutional decision-making processes of the AIIB lies 
in the non-residential status of its Board of Directors.102 This is at variance to 
the World Bank’s Board, which is permanently resident in Washington D.C. 
Although the AIIB Board of Directors is expected to have regular ‘physical’ 
meetings, there is provision to have ‘virtual’ meetings as needed at other 
times. 103  Technological advances in video/Skype remote conferencing will 
therefore allow the AIIB to make significant institutional efficiency cost-savings 
                                                        
99 Zedillo Commission report (2009) op. cit., at p.xi. 
100 Ibid., at p.xiv. 
101 Article 25(1) of the AIIB Charter. 
102 Article 27(1), ibid. 
103 Article 27(4), ibid., provides that: ‘The Board of Directors shall establish procedures whereby 
the Board can hold an electronic meeting or vote on a matter without holding a meeting.’ 
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before its work program of financial and technical support for infrastructure 
development even begins. 
 
Finally, one of Mahbubani’s main bugbears against US and European 
dominance of the World Bank and IMF was the fact that the leadership of these 
global financial institutions is traditionally switched between European and 
American nationals, in apparent disregard of transparency and meritocracy as 
a basis for these appointments. This has recently lead Mahbubani and Summers 
to prescribe that: ‘Picking strong leaders for the major international institutions 
and keeping those institutions’ operations from being undermined or 
politicized would be a major step forward.’104 Mahbubani and Summers have 
also highlighted the fact that the leadership and dominance of the United States 
and Europe in these financial institutions has occasionally been exploited to 
achieve extra-financial goals.105 As Nielson et al note, the culture within the 
World Bank is dominated by a neo-liberal economic theory-based, technocratic 
approach to problems, while in its operational policy, ‘the Bank is characterized 
by its Washington-centric approval culture...’106 
 
                                                        
104 Mahbubani & Summers, Foreign Affairs (2016) op. cit., at 133. 
105 Ibid., at 134. 
106 Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney & Catherine E. Weaver, ‘Bridging the rationalist–
constructivist divide: re-engineering the culture of the World Bank’, Journal of International 
Relations and Development, Vol.9 (2006) 107–139, at 109. 
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In this regard, the AIIB has sought to differentiate itself from the World Bank 
by not requiring privatization or deregulation as conditions for funding. 107 
Notably, Article 31(2) of the AIIB Charter specifies that only economic 
considerations shall be relevant to AIIB decisions. This should allow the AIIB 
to maintain an apolitical and therefore pragmatic approach to the technical 
aspects of its work, in line with an ‘Asian values’ orientation towards what works 
in practice, rather than the fulfilment of any specific political economic theory. 
 
The institutional governance deficiency in the World Bank and IMF leadership 
selection process identified above has ostensibly been addressed by the AIIB 
Presidential appointment process, wherein the AIIB Charter provides that the 
President shall be elected through an open, transparent and merit-based 
process, by a Super Majority (i.e., greater than 75%) vote in the Board of 
Governors, and that he (or she) should be a national of a regional member.108 
However, given that China’s overall vote share in the AIIB is reported to be 
higher than 25%, China effectively has a veto on any proposed AIIB Presidential 
appointment that it does not approve of. This gives rise to similar concerns as 
those expressed against US and European preferences in World Bank and IMF 
leadership appointments. Nor will this concern be alleviated by the envisaged 
growth of this new MDB from a regionally-focussed organization to one with a 
global reach. While AIIB Member State representatives recognized that the 
                                                        
107 Koh Gui Qing, ‘Exclusive: China's AIIB to offer loans with fewer strings attached – sources’, 
Reuters, Business News, 1 September, 2015. Accessible at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-aiib-china-loans-idUSKCN0R14UB20150901 
108 Article 29(1), referring to Article 28(2)(ii) of the AIIB Charter. 
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Board of Governors might need to exercise some flexibility in the future that 
would reduce the regional shareholding percentage below 75%, they 
nevertheless agreed that a minimum of 70% regional shareholding would be 
important in preserving the regional character of the Bank.109  
 
Moving on from examining the ‘Asian values’ approach in relation to the 
institutional framework and decision-making procedures of the AIIB,  the final 
substantive section of this article will proceed to assess this approach with 
specific regard to the environmental and social risk assessment provisions of 
this new MDB. 
 
The ‘Asian Values’ Approach to Environmental and Social 
Sustainability Risks within AIIB Projects 
To begin with, Article 13(1) of the Charter provides that when making financing 
decisions, the Bank will be guided by ‘sound banking principles in its 
operations’. The Bank has also undertaken to ensure that each of its operations 
complies with its environmental and social policies. Specifically, the Bank shall 
ensure that each of its operations complies with the Bank’s operational and 
financial policies, including without limitation, policies addressing 
environmental and social impacts. 110  These policies are in turn subject to 
approval by the Board of Directors in accordance with Article 26 and will be 
based on international best practices.111  
                                                        
109 Article 5(2) & (3) of AIIB Charter, op. cit. 
110 Article 13(4), ibid. 
111  See: Report on the Articles of Agreement   of the AIIB, by the Chief Negotiators   for 
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Within this context, one of the main concerns raised by international civil 
society/non-governmental organizations (NGOs) over the streamlined 
decision-making systems and procedures for AIIB lending relates to the 
potentially reduced oversight role that these procedures may provide over 
social and environmental impacts of the approved infrastructure development 
projects funded by the new Bank. In recognition of these concerns, the Board 
of Directors of the AIIB committed to the establishment of environmental and 
social policies for the Bank, resulting in the adoption of an Environmental and 
Social Framework in February, 2016.112 This environmental and social policy 
framework was developed through a consultative process with AIIB's Founding 
Members and other stakeholders.113 In this regard, the overall Framework is 
composed inter alia of an Environmental and Social Policy (ESP) comprising 
mandatory environmental and social requirements for each project that the 
Bank finances, as well as Environmental and Social Standards (ESSs) 
comprising three associated mandatory sets of environmental and social 
standards, which in turn establish more detailed environmental and social 
requirements.114  
                                                        
Establishing the AIIB, Singapore, 22 May, 2015. 4pp,  at 3. Accessible at:  
https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/basic-documents/_download/articles-of-
agreement/basic_document_report_on_the_articles_of_agreement.pdf 
112 Available at AIIB website: 
http://www.aiib.org/html/aboutus/Operational_Policies/Environmental_Social/?show=3 
113  See: AIIB, Environmental and Social Framework, February, 2016. Available at: 
http://www.aiib.org/uploadfile/2016/0226/20160226043633542.pdf 
114 See: AIIB, Environmental and Social Framework, February, 2016, op. cit. 
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However, even prior to the publication of this Framework and its associated 
Policy and Standards, specific concerns had already been raised regarding both 
the consultation and implementation of these standards for AIIB-supported 
projects. 115  As Kim notes, no one can be certain of the extent of the AIIB 
commitment to environmental and social sustainability until detailed 
information on how the new Bank decides which projects it will fund is 
known. 116  While information about the precise decision-making criteria, 
procedures, as well as applicable social and environmental standards within 
AIIB-funded projects have yet to be published, discernible institutional 
differences are already emerging and they may lead to different outcomes in 
practice.  
 
For example, the AIIB aims to have a simpler internal review and risk 
assessment system for projects compared with its peers in order to hold down 
costs and cut red tape. This is now manifest in the AIIB Risk Assessment 
                                                        
115 Navigating the New Normal: China and Global Resource Governance, by Felix Preston, 
Rob Bailey and Siân Bradley (from Chatham House) & Dr Wei Jigang and Dr Zhao Changwen 
of the Development Research Center (DRC) of the Chinese State Council, Joint DRC and 
Chatham House report, 16 January, 2016, at 31. Available at: 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-01-
27-china-global-resource-governance-preston-bailey-bradley-wei-zhao-final.pdf 
116 Jisan Kim, ‘Regulating Economic Development: Environmental and Social Standards of the 
AIIB and the IFC’, Harvard Journal of International Law, April 21, 2016. Available at: 
http://www.harvardilj.org/2016/04/regulating-economic-development-environmental-and-
social-standards-of-the-aiib-and-the-ifc/ 
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Framework,117 whose risk philosophy aims to be the foundational pillar of the 
Bank’s risk management and the guiding basis for the entire risk governance 
framework. 118 The AIIB’s high-level, overarching philosophy of its ‘risk 
management’ function is constituted by the following three aims in its ‘Mission 
Statement’: 
‘i)  Enable the Bank to fulfill its mandate to promote infrastructure and other 
productive sectors;  
ii)  Ensure the stability and financial continuity of the Bank through efficient 
capital allocation and utilization, and comprehensively manage risks and 
reputational consequences;  
iii)  And foster strong risk culture by embedding risk accountability in the 
Bank.’119 
The AIIB Risk Assessment Framework then elaborates on the last of these aims 
with the following statement: ‘As an integral part of the institution’s operations, 
AIIB takes extra precaution in appropriately managing its risks, and will only 
aim to take risks which it understands thoroughly and can adequately 
manage.’120 (emphasis added)  
 
It is notable that there is no explicit mention of environmental and social 
sustainability risks here, at least until these are defined in paragraph 26 of the 
                                                        
117  AIIB Risk Asessment Framework, published: November, 2016. Available at: 
https://www.aiib.org/en/policies-strategies/_download/risk-management-framework/AIIB-
Risk-Management-Framework-final-14Nov-clean.pdf 
118 Ibid.., at para.7. 
119 Ibid., at para.8. 
120 Ibid., at para.8.1.1.  
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AIIB Risk Framework by direct cross-reference to its Environmental and Social 
Framework, as follows: ‘Environmental and Social Risk is the risk of breaching 
any environmental and social rules and commitments as covered in the Bank’s 
Environmental and Social Framework.’ Paragraph 36.1 of the Risk Framework 
then builds on this cross-reference in the following way: ‘Integrity, 
Environmental & Social, and Reputational Risks management and mitigation 
comprises the identification of the most relevant risks for the Bank along with 
their accompanying impact assessment; mitigation and crisis management; 
reporting and monitoring; as well as developing an action plan. With respect to 
projects, such risks are managed through the applicable Bank operational 
policies and directives and their application in the preparation and 
implementation of projects, including the corresponding policy assurance.’  
 
While it is possible to conclude from these provisions that environmental and 
social sustainability considerations are now included within the AIIB decision-
making criteria, and thereby also integrated into the AIIB project decision-
making process; the fact remains that the AIIB is not expected to unnecessarily 
delay project approvals to allow all parties to do due diligence. Such delays are 
a common feature at the World Bank and other MDBs as they have become 
more risk-averse over time but this has in turn led to criticism that these MDBs 
have become slow and bureaucratic. Notwithstanding the optimal outcomes 
these different institutional priorities and practices might stimulate through 
competition between MDBs for prime international development finance 
projects, the advent of the AIIB has already prompted other MDBs to review 
how they work. Such MDB competition to finance major projects can be to the 
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potential benefit of prospective borrowers, but also to the possible detriment of 
social and environmental sustainability in relation to these projects. 
 
Moreover, the simplification of due diligence, particularly when combined with 
the less-risk averse loan/investment decision-making procedures that the AIIB 
has already trailed as one of its operational efficiency aims, does not augur well 
for the last of the three strictures that the AIIB has bound itself to uphold, 
namely, international best practice in the application of social and 
environmental standards. This issue is especially pertinent when we consider 
that one of the stated aims of the AIIB is to focus on major infrastructure 
development projects. Such major projects almost inevitably result in equally 
significant social and environmental impacts, thereby necessitating more, not 
less, due diligence on the part of institutional lenders such as the AIIB.  
 
Initial assessments of the AIIB environmental and social framework have 
yielded a mixed bag of results. A World Resources Institute comment observed 
that: ‘On some issues, the AIIB has embraced more progressive positions than 
some of its peers. For example, the AIIB excludes financing for commercial 
logging operations in tropical or old-growth forests, which goes beyond the 
current commitment made by the World Bank. On other subjects, the AIIB’s 
commitments are not quite as strong. For example, the AIIB has not followed 
the lead of the ADB or International Finance Corporation (IFC) in giving 
Indigenous Peoples the right to consent to activities taking place on their 
lands.’121 
                                                        
121  Gaia Larsen and Sean Gilbert, ‘Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Releases New 
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According to Kim, many environmental provisions of the AIIB Standards are on 
par with that of the IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and Social 
Sustainability.122  For instance, in its pollution prevention section, the AIIB 
cites the World Bank Group’s Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines 
(EHSGs) and ensures that its projects will follow these EHSGs. On the other 
hand, the AIIB Standards lack detail or are different in ways that may lead to 
arbitrary outcomes. Kim has outlined a few examples of these discrepancies, as 
follows: 
 
1) The IFC Performance Standards provide more detailed requirements on 
how adverse environmental effects should be mitigated, applying 
specific terms such as ‘no net loss’ of biodiversity and ‘set-aside’ areas of 
significant biodiversity value. 123  By contrast, the corresponding AIIB 
requirement appears to be merely to ‘avoid adverse Project impacts on 
biodiversity. When avoidance of adverse impacts is not possible, 
                                                        
Environmental and Social Standards: How Do They Stack Up?’, World Resources Institute Blog 
Post, 4 March, 2016. Available at: 
http://www.wri.org/blog/2016/03/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-releases-new-
environmental-and-social-standards 
122  The latest version of the IFC Performance Standards was adopted on 1 January, 2012. 
Available from IFC website, at: 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/c8f524004a73daeca09afdf998895a12/IFC_Performa
nce_Standards.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
123  See, for example, paragraph 15 under IFC Performance Standard 6 on Biodiversity 
Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources. 
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implement measures to minimize adverse impacts and restore 
biodiversity, including, as a last resort, biodiversity offsets.’124 The AIIB 
requirements are therefore not as detailed as the IFC’s, inter alia 
providing that any conversion or degradation of natural habitats is 
appropriately mitigated through ‘measures acceptable to the Bank’.125 
According to Kim, if the AIIB is not rigorous in its evaluation of 
mitigation measures, recipients of funding may be able to escape with 
implementing measures that are superficial, cheap, and ineffective; 126 
 
2) For projects located in natural habitats, the AIIB requires a cost-benefit 
analysis of the proposed project to be undertaken, to ensure that, inter 
alia, the Project’s overall benefits substantially outweigh the 
environmental costs. 127  As the IFC Standards do not have a similar 
requirement, the IFC may finance projects even if the overall economic 
benefits are deemed not to ‘substantially outweigh’ the environmental 
costs. Nevertheless, Kim cautions that such cost-benefit analysis will not 
always lead to wise decisions, because it is unclear how the AIIB will 
conduct cost-benefit analyses, so the ultimate decision could be 
arbitrary. Indeed, the AIIB may allow projects that significantly destroy 
natural habitats by simply concluding that the overall benefit of the 
                                                        
124  See: ‘B. Environmental Coverage’, in AIIB Environmental and Social Standard 1: 
Environmental and Social Assessment and Management. 
125 Ibid. 
126 See: Kim, Harv J of Int L (2016) op. cit. 
127 AIIB Environmental and Social Standard 1, op. cit. 
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Project does in fact ‘substantially outweigh’ the cost. Thus, the cost-
benefit analysis might be used to justify or defend AIIB’s decisions to 
value economic gain over environmental protection;128 
 
3) Finally, when critical habitats of high biodiversity value are involved, the 
IFC will not implement any project activities unless several imperative 
criteria are met. These criteria include the fact that there will be no 
measurable adverse impacts on this biodiversity and the ecological 
processes supporting this biodiversity, as well as no net reduction in 
global, regional or national populations of endangered species in these 
critical habitats. By contrast, while there appears to be a similar, initial 
presumption that AIIB-sponsored ‘Project activities in areas of critical 
habitats are prohibited’, the AIIB then focuses on whether any adverse 
impacts impair the habitat’s ‘ability to function’. 129  Based on the 
different wording and emphasis in these separate texts, Kim postulates 
that the AIIB may ultimately allow a project by determining that a 
habitat may be able to function even if many of its biodiversity values are 
lost, whereas the IFC would not allow a project that would reduce 
biodiversity values, even if the habitat were able to function.130  
 
AIIB and World Bank Group Co-ordination Initiatives 
While concerns remain over the current lack of adequate social and 
                                                        
128 Kim (2016) op. cit. 
129 AIIB Environmental and Social Standard 1, op. cit. 
130 Kim (2016) op. cit. 
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environmental impact considerations, as well as the simplified decision-making 
procedures within the AIIB, there are signs that both the AIIB and its Western 
counterparts have recognised the need for co-operation and coordination of 
their efforts, if only to prevent wastefulness and ‘race to the bottom’ scenarios 
in relation to the social and environmental impacts of infrastructure projects 
they finance. Thus, a recent World Bank press release announced the signing 
by World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim and AIIB President Jin Liqun of 
the first Co-Financing Framework Agreement between the World Bank and 
AIIB in April, 2016.131 The Agreement outlines the co-financing parameters for 
World Bank/AIIB investment projects and paves the way for the two 
institutions to jointly develop projects.  
 
Pursuant to this Agreement, the World Bank and the AIIB are currently 
discussing nearly a dozen co-financed projects in sectors that include transport, 
water and energy in Central Asia, South Asia and East Asia. In 2016 alone, the 
AIIB expects to approve about $1.2 billion in financing, with World Bank joint 
projects anticipated to account for a sizeable share of this overall total. 
Significantly, in relation to the previously expressed concerns over social and 
environmental considerations, it is the World Bank that will prepare and 
supervise the co-financed projects under this institutional co-financing 
agreement in accordance with its policies and procedures in areas like 
                                                        
131  World Bank and AIIB Sign First Co-Financing Framework Agreement, April 13, 2016. 
Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/04/13/world-bank-
and-aiib-sign-first-co-financing-framework-agreement 
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procurement, environment and social safeguards.132 
 
Conclusions 
As we look forward to the third decade of the 21st Century, the advent of the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has afforded us a welcome opportunity 
to re-visit the ‘Asian values’ debate to see whether these values still have 
traction as a means to both explain and assess the institutional design of this 
new Multilateral Development Bank, as well as advance a new variety of 
capitalism, while maintaining social cohesion and environmental resilience. As 
a stark projection of Chinese, and wider Asian, economic power, the AIIB 
represents a real statement of intent on the growing role that Asian 
governments can and should play on the global economic governance stage. 
Interrogating both the perception and reality of Chinese dominance of the AIIB 
also represents a microcosm of how China is ‘defending, contesting and 
negotiating with the liberal global order in a historically contingent social world 
with a view to shaping normative change in global international society.’133 
Whether the growing influence of Chinese (and wider Asian) power within 
these new forms of international governance across the world will also bring 
about a change of institutional culture, to one that is imbued by ‘Asian values’, 
is a compelling international policy and legal research question for the near 
future.  
This essay has hopefully provided a situational context in which we can trace 
both the positive and negative attributes of such ‘Asian values’ within the AIIB 
                                                        
132 Ibid. 
133 Zhang, International Affairs (2016) op. cit., at 797. 
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and possibly other new MDBs as well, with a view to assessing whether these 
values have been successfully promoted and implemented within these new 
forms of global economic governance. Time will tell whether an increasingly 
‘Asian values’-influenced set of international economic and finance institutions, 
beginning with the AIIB examined here, can better lead the world to a more 
socio-economically and environmentally sustainable future. To this end, the 
present essay should serve as a basic building block of a new research agenda 
for assessing whether the future operations of this Bank, as well as other new 
MDBs, uphold an ‘Asian values’ approach to global economic governance. 
